Budget padding and the law

Below is the section of the Nigerian constitution which deals with finances of the country. 

NASS holds the purse strings of the national treasure. The Executive has the responsibility to deliver to the Nigerian people, budgets approved by NASS.

The federal and  states executives make financial and fiscal proposals called the budget to NASS and various SHA. 

The SHA and NASS being the custodians of our national and states purses have the powers to scrutinise and approve proposals from the executives. 

NASS and SHA can relocate, increase and or decrease, approve or reject proposed budgetary demands according to the states and national ability. It can agree for the federal and states to borrow or not as the case maybe. 

To the vexed issue of budget padding. This should not be a concept known to law at least in legislative oversight and approval functions. 

As an example, the FGN allocates N5 billion to building a rail line from Benin to Lagos without between stops. The Senator in whose constituency, Ore is located is worried that that town would suffer since the town's main income is passing trade from traffic between Lagos and Benin which will drop causing untold hardship to its people. He inserts a clause increasing the proposed budget from N5 billion to N7 billion to enable that the Benin-Lagos rail line have a stop at Ore. In the context of our current debate on budget padding that will be "padding". 

This line of thought is wrong and not taking the entire Part E of our constitution into account. 

Of course, one always has to take the Nigerian dimension into consideration. But it's important to get the legal framework right and then discuss the political problems. 

In the US, the Congress always increases the budget for the military if when such request have not been made by the presidency, this to fund pet projects in their constituencies. It's sometimes called pot barrel clauses. 

When we cry wolf, we should when there is a wolf not in the likelihood of a wolf. 

E - Powers and Control over Public Funds

 

80. (1) All revenues or other moneys raised or received by the Federation (not being revenues or other moneys payable under this Constitution or any Act of the National Assembly into any other public fund of the Federation established for a specific purpose) shall be paid into and form one Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation.

(2) No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation except to meet expenditure that is charged upon the fund by this Constitution or where the issue of those moneys has been authorised by an Appropriation Act, Supplementary Appropriation Act or an Act passed in pursuance of section 81 of this Constitution.

(3) No moneys shall be withdrawn from any public fund of the Federation, other than the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation, unless the issue of those moneys has been authorised by an Act of the National Assembly.

(4) No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund or any other public fund of the Federation, except in the manner prescribed by the National Assembly.

81. (1) The President shall cause to be prepared and laid before each House of the National Assembly at any time in each financial year estimates of the revenues and expenditure of the Federation for the next following financial year.

(2) The heads of expenditure contained in the estimates (other than expenditure charged upon the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation by this Constitution) shall be included in a bill, to be known as an Appropriation Bill, providing for the issue from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the sums necessary to meet that expenditure and the appropriation of those sums for the purposes specified therein.

(3) Any amount standing to the credit of the judiciary in the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation shall be paid directly to the National Judicial Council for disbursement to the heads of the courts established for the Federation and the State under section 6 of this Constitution.

(4) If in respect of any financial year it is found that -

(a) the amount appropriated by the Appropriation Act for any purpose is insufficient; or

(b) a need has arisen for expenditure for a purpose for which no amount has been appropriated by the Act,

a supplementary estimate showing the sums required shall be laid before each House of the National Assembly and the heads of any such expenditure shall be included in a Supplementary Appropriation Bill.

82. If the Appropriation Bill in respect of any financial year has not been passed into law by the beginning of the financial year, the President may authorise the withdrawal of moneys in the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation for the purpose of meeting expenditure necessary to carry on the services of the Government of the Federation for a period not exceeding months or until the coming into operation of the Appropriate Act, whichever is the earlier:

Provided that the withdrawal in respect of any such period shall not exceed the amount authorised to be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation under the provisions of the Appropriation Act passed by the National Assembly for the corresponding period in the immediately preceding financial year, being an amount proportionate to the total amount so authorised for the immediately preceding financial year.

83. (1) The National Assembly may by law make provisions for the establishment of a Contingencies Fund for the Federation and for authorising the President, if satisfied that there has arisen an urgent and unforeseen need for expenditure for which no other provision exists, to make advances from the Fund to meet the need.

(2) Where any advance is made in accordance with the provisions of this section, a Supplementary Estimate shall be presented and a Supplementary Appropriation Bill shall be introduced as soon as possible for the purpose of replacing the amount so advanced.

84. (1) There shall be paid to the holders of the offices mentioned in this section such remuneration, salaries and allowances as may be prescribed by the National Assembly, but not exceeding the amount as shall have been determined by the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission.

(2) The remuneration, salaries and allowances payable to the holders of the offices so mentioned shall be a charge upon the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation.

(3) The remuneration and salaries payable to the holders of the said offices and their conditions of service, other than allowances, shall not be altered to their disadvantage after their appointment.

(4) The offices aforesaid are the offices of President, Vice-President, Chief Justice of Nigeria, Justice of the Supreme Court, President of the Court of Appeal, Justice of the Court of Appeal, Chief Judge of the Federal High Court, Judge of the Federal High Court, Chief Judge and Judge of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Chief Judge of a State, Judge of the High Court of a State, Grand Kadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, President and Judge of the Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Grand Kadi and Kadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal of a State, President and Judge of the Customary Court of Appeal of a State, the Auditor-General for the Federation and the Chairmen and members of the following executive bodies, namely, the Code of Conduct Bureau, the Federal Civil Service Commission, the Independent National Electoral Commission, the National Judicial Council, the Federal Judicial Service Commission, the Judicial Service Committee of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, the Federal Character Commission, the Code of Conduct Tribunal, the National Population Commission, the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission, the Nigeria Police Council and the Police Service Commission.

(5) Any person who has held office as President or Vice-President shall be entitled to pension for life at a rate equivalent to the annual salary of the incumbent President or Vice-President:

Provided that such a person was not removed from office by the process of impeachment or for breach of any provisions of this Constitution.

(6) Any pension granted by virtue of subsection (5) of this section shall be a charge upon the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation.

(7) The recurrent expenditure of judicial offices in the Federation (in addition to salaries and allowances of the judicial officers mentioned in subsection (4) of this section) shall be charge upon the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation.

85. (1) There shall be an Auditor-General for the Federation who shall be appointed in accordance with the provisions of section 86 of this Constitution.

(2) The public accounts of the Federation and of all offices and courts of the Federation shall be audited and reported on to the Auditor-General who shall submit his reports to the National Assembly; and for that purpose, the Auditor-General or any person authorised by him in that behalf shall have access to all the books, records, returns and other documents relating to those accounts.

(3) Nothing in subsection (2) of this section shall be construed as authorising the Auditor-General to audit the accounts of or appoint auditors for government statutory corporations, commissions, authorities, agencies, including all persons and bodies established by an Act of the National Assembly, but the Auditor-General shall -

(a) provide such bodies with -

(i) a list of auditors qualified to be appointed by them as external auditors and from which the bodies shall appoint their external auditors, and

(ii) guidelines on the level of fees to be paid to external auditors; and

(b) comment on their annual accounts and auditor's reports thereon.

(4) The Auditor-General shall have power to conduct checks of all government statutory corporations, commissions, authorities, agencies, including all persons and bodies established by an Act of the National Assembly.

(5) The Auditor-General shall, within ninety days of receipt of the Accountant-General's financial statement, submit his reports under this section to each House of the National Assembly and each House shall cause the reports to be considered by a committee of the House of the National Assembly responsible for public accounts.

(6) In the exercise of his functions under this Constitution, the Auditor-General shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other authority or person.

86. (1) The Auditor-General for the Federation shall be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Federal Civil Service Commission subject to confirmation by the Senate.

(2) The power to appoint persons to act in the office of the Auditor-General shall vest in the President.

(3) Except with the sanction of a resolution of the Senate, no person shall act in the office of the Auditor-General for a period exceeding six months.

87. (1) A person holding the office of the Auditor-General for the Federation shall be removed from office by the President acting on an address supported by two-thirds majority of the Senate praying that he be so removed for inability to discharge the functions of his-office (whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or any other cause) or for misconduct.

(2) The Auditor-General shall not be removed from office before such retiring age as may be prescribed by law, save in accordance with the provisions of this section.

88. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, each House of the National Assembly shall have power by resolution published in its journal or in the Official Gazette of the Government of the Federation to direct or cause to be directed investigation into -

(a) any matter or thing with respect to which it has power to make laws, and

(b) the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or government department charged, or intended to be charged, with the duty of or responsibility for -

(i) executing or administering laws enacted by National Assembly, and

(ii) disbursing or administering moneys appropriated or to be appropriated by the National Assembly.

(2) The powers conferred on the National Assembly under the provisions of this section are exercisable only for the purpose of enabling it to -

(a) make laws with respect to any matter within its legislative competence and correct any defects in existing laws; and

(b) expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it.

89. (1) For the purposes of any investigation under section 88 of this Constitutional and subject to the provisions thereof, the Senate or the House of Representatives or a committee appointed in accordance with section 62 of this Constitution shall have power to -

(a) procure all such evidence, written or oral, direct or circumstantial, as it may think necessary or desirable, and examine all persons as witnesses whose evidence may be material or relevant to the subject matter;

(b) require such evidence to be given on oath;

(c) summon any person in Nigeria to give evidence at any place or produce any document or other thing in his possession or under his control, and examine him as a witness and require him to produce any document or other thing in his possession or under his control, subject to all just exceptions; and

(d) issue a warrant to compel the attendance of any person who, after having been summoned to attend, fails, refuses or neglects to do so and does not excuse such failure, refusal or neglect to the satisfaction of the House or the committee in question, and order him to pay all costs which may have been occasioned in compelling his attendance or by reason of his failure, refusal or neglect to obey the summons, and also to impose such fine as may be prescribed for any such failure, refused or neglect; and any fine so imposed shall be recoverable in the same manner as a fine imposed by a court of law.

(2) A summons or warrant issued under this section may be served or executed by any member of the Nigeria Police Force or by any person authorised in that behalf by the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may require.

The Many Africas

In his memoir, The Lion Awakes, Ashish Thakkar describes how, as a young entrepreneur selling computer parts across Africa in the 1990s, he noticed that flights within the continent seemed to take longer than the distances on a map would suggest. “Were the planes slower?” he wondered. In fact, he learned, the commonly used Mercator projection vastly understates the size of Africa, and its 54 countries, relative to other continents. You wouldn’t know it from most maps, but the continent is large enough to fit China, India, Mexico, the United States, and western Europe within its borders—with room to spare.

The distortion of Africa goes beyond cartography; Western journalists and academics have a history of misinterpreting and misrepresenting the region. Failing to account for the size, diversity, and dynamism of the continent—and relying on incomplete and inaccurate data—they have fashioned easy-to-comprehend yet warped and incomplete stories. In past decades, the main story line tended to be one of failure, focused on conflict, disease, corruption, victimhood, and poverty. A headline on the cover of The Economist in 2000 captured the gloom: “The hopeless continent.” By 2011, however, the magazine touted an “Africa rising.” But such simplistic optimism does not capture the full story, either. With more than one billion people, over 2,000 languages, and some of the fastest rates of national GDP growth in this century, the real Africa has always been more complicated.

Challenging as it is to properly capture the complexities and contradictions of a region as large, diverse, and dynamic as Africa, three recent books seek to replace the caricatures of Africa’s economic performance with more accurate pictures. Morten Jerven picks apart the flawed analyses of mainstream economists, Thakkar recounts his two decades of personal experience as an entrepreneur, and Jake Bright and Aubrey Hruby tally the risks and benefits of doing business on the continent. Taken together, these books provide a valuable corrective to the fraying narrative of failure. The Africa that emerges from their pages is one of remarkable energy, creativity, and opportunity, in spite of the grave challenges.

Ultimately, however, their accounts still add up to an incomplete story. In emphasizing economic and business perspectives, the authors cannot tell readers how much people’s lives are actually improving, whether individuals are becoming more or less capable of achieving their aspirations, whether communities are becoming more or less resilient to crisis, and whether the distribution of benefits in Africa is becoming more or less equal.

THE DEVIL IS IN THE DATA

According to Jerven, the dominant narrative of African economic failure persists because economists ask the wrong question: they seek to explain why Africa has failed rather than show how Africa has actually performed. In fact, over the last century, many African economies have experienced episodes of both growth and decline. Immediately after independence in the 1950s and 1960s, African economies grew faster on average than the rest of the world. They lagged behind from the mid-1970s into the 1990s, largely due to external shocks and bad policies, before growth returned in the late 1990s. Economists missed this variation, Jerven argues, in part because they were so intent on explaining failure.

They were also basing their analyses on incomplete data sets and incorrect assumptions. Nearly all economic data capture only the value of goods that flow through official channels, missing the informal sector, even though it is crucial to livelihoods across the developing world. Worse, when data are missing for a country, economists simply extrapolate from neighboring countries, ignoring important differences in resource wealth, human capital, and trade. Many data sets go back only to 1960, so there is no historical context to explain the economic activity that followed. Other data, such as estimates of corruption, are based on opinion surveys rather than direct observation.

A billboard advertising Hennessy cognac near the lagoon in Ikoyi district in Lagos, June 2013.

To illustrate the resulting distortion, Jerven compares the rankings of 45 sub-Saharan countries by per capita GDP in three commonly used data sets. In one of these, Guinea ranks as the seventh-poorest country, but in another, it just misses inclusion among the ten richest countries. Mozambique, depending on the source, is among either the eight poorest or the 12 richest African countries. Given the uncertainty in the data, it’s hard to see why anyone should rely on policy recommendations based on such flawed sources. Garbage in, garbage out.

Jerven also charges that economists mistake correlation for causation, leading them to identify faulty silver-bullet explanations for Africa’s economic performance. He rejects arguments that blame slow growth on the absence of robust institutions, a lack of social capital, or particular features of a country’s history, ethnicity, climate, or geography. Weak institutions may correlate with low GDP, he argues, but studies have not reliably demonstrated which way the causality runs. He challenges the data and conclusions in Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson’s Why Nations Fail, which pinned the blame for poverty on extractive government institutions. To claim that Africa is poor because of weak institutions may get the relationship backward; poverty may be a cause of weak institutions.

The distortion of Africa goes beyond cartography.

Ultimately, Jerven concludes that although the narrative of chronic failure is a distortion, so is the “Africa rising” narrative. Again, the problem is exacerbated by the scarcity of reliable data. He points out that many countries have not updated the baseline data from which they calculate GDP. In 2014, when Nigeria updated the base year it uses to estimate the size of various sectors, its official GDP nearly doubled overnight, surpassing that of South Africa. Was the country suddenly twice as rich? Not yet. As other African countries update their own economic benchmarks, their GDP figures will also rise, perhaps due more to better measurement than to increases in economic activity—thus making it harder to determine the real rate of growth.

Finally, rising GDP figures reveal nothing about the informal sector and very little about a country’s level of poverty or vulnerability to future shocks. Jerven thus worries that such upticks in GDP convey misleading information about the conditions of average citizens’ lives. To get a more accurate picture, he calls on economists to capture country-level nuances by studying actual economies rather than fishing from afar for correlations in abstract numbers. This is valuable advice, but even a careful study of actual economies will face many of the same shortcomings that hinder broader analyses, unless the quality and availability of data improve substantially. Moreover, observers should still pay attention to correlations among growth and governance and history, even when perfect causality may not be established.

THE START-UP CONTINENT

For greater nuance and a larger dose of optimism, look to The Lion Awakes, a compelling homage to Thakkar’s family and an argument for correcting the reputation of the continent Thakkar has come to know as an entrepreneur. Contrary to its image in Western media, Thakkar argues, Africa is not a “hopeless charity case” but a continent open for business. It is a good place to launch and grow a profitable company, enjoy a high quality of life, and even get rich. Thakkar’s Mara Group, which invests in companies across the region, is presented as proof of this claim, and he offers his personal story as a striking example of the triumph of commerce and confidence over trauma.

Economists mistake correlation for causation, leading them to identify faulty silver-bullet explanations for Africa’s economic performance.

Thakkar comes from a family of Indian traders in Uganda. His parents lost everything during the brutal reign of Idi Amin; after Amin expelled Asians from the country in 1972, they fled to the United Kingdom, where Thakkar was born. Years later, eager to return to Africa, his family found itself in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. Once they returned to Uganda, the 15-year-old Thakkar began selling computer parts he sourced from Dubai.

Thakkar recalls his early travels in Africa in the mid-1990s, when “running water was a luxury,” “constant electricity blackouts” were the norm, and “phones didn’t work.” Around the turn of the millennium, however, things started to improve. Thakkar observed that in places as diverse as Kampala, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, and Lagos, “customs officials in those once chaotic airports were starting to smile a bit more and play by the rules. . . . The potholes were getting fixed. Garbage was being collected.” Africa, particularly within its cities, was shedding its past and becoming a confident, viable place for modern business. Thakkar’s own interests expanded from computer sales to include banking, real estate, information technology, call centers, glass factories, packaging, philanthropy, and more.

The key drivers of progress he identifies include improved leadership (exemplified in his view by President Paul Kagame of Rwanda), an innovative telecommunications industry, an energetic youth population unleashing its pent-up demand, and the return of a highly educated diaspora, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis reoriented African expatriates’ perspective on the geography of opportunity. Most important, he says, was the arrival of cell phones; according to a 2015 report by the telecommunications company Ericsson, the number of mobile subscriptions in Africa has reached 690 million.

Thakkar also highlights the development of technology hubs, such as Kenya’s “Silicon Savannah,” and the explosion of Nollywood, Nigeria’s $3.3 billion movie industry, and he champions Africa’s many vibrant new start-ups. For him, the answer to Africa’s economic challenges is business, not foreign aid. “Western policies of institutionalized aid have done terrible harm to Africa for decades,” he writes, whereas China has flourished economically without such aid.

In reality, however, China has received billions of dollars in Western aid. And although aid to Africa has not been as beneficial as its strongest proponents claim, it has not been as damaging as Thakkar suggests, either. Aid should be judged at the level of particular projects in individual countries over time; it is no more helpful to caricature foreign aid than it has been to caricature its recipients.

OPEN FOR BUSINESS

Bright and Hruby, both of whom have experience with Africa in the private sector, present a similarly upbeat, although more analytic and cautious, picture. They set out to achieve a balance between “overly simplistic ‘Africa rising’ narratives” and what they criticize as “a new strain of Afro-pessimism.” While recognizing the limitations on the quantity and quality of available data, they call for a “multi-dimensional . . . more refined and data-driven” approach.

It is no more helpful to caricature foreign aid than it has been to caricature its recipients.

Over the past decade, Western businesses have started to take Africa more seriously. One factor behind this enthusiasm, Bright and Hruby note, has been better governance, including more multiparty elections, improvements in transparency, and tighter fiscal management. Bright and Hruby attribute greater importance than Jerven does to the role of institutions, yet demography may matter most of all: Africa boasts the world’s fastest-growing population, largest youth population, most rapidly urbanizing population, and fastest-growing consumer class. The result has been an explosion of demand for a range of consumer basics, from air travel to supermarket goods.

As does Thakkar, Bright and Hruby tell the story of innovation. M-Pesa, a mobile-phone-based payment system in Kenya, now handles transactions equivalent to one-third of the country’s entire GDP, providing millions of Kenyans with an alternative to bank accounts and credit cards. They also document a thriving culture of entrepreneurship that has emerged across the continent, including such start-ups as BRCK (a rugged WiFi router developed in Kenya and designed for rural areas) and Jumia (a Nigerian e-commerce site that lets buyers pay cash on delivery). They paint a picture of fast-paced technological growth and innovation that, in some sectors, have surpassed and influenced the West.

Despite their enthusiasm, Bright and Hruby catalog a number of challenges to continued growth. In several areas, Africa still accounts for less than its expected share of global activity. They call this “the problem of less than 3 percent”: even though it is home to almost 15 percent of the world’s population, Africa accounts for less than three percent of Google hits, less than three percent of global trade, less than three percent of mobile broadband subscriptions, and less than three percent of global private equity investment.

Rwandan President Paul Kagame at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, January 2016.

Africa also suffers from serious gaps in infrastructure. Only 32 percent of sub-Saharan Africans have regular access to electricity, and only one in four has a bank account. Africa’s road network is sparse and potholed, with Nigeria, the continent’s economic powerhouse, having a rate of road penetration that is just 15 percent of India’s. Just as Thakkar noticed decades ago, in many parts of the continent today, blackouts are still frequent, running water remains a luxury, and ATMs are largely absent.

Beyond these serious challenges, there are three “deal breakers” for Bright and Hruby that could set the region back. Africa’s large and growing unemployed youth population presents one of the greatest risks to political and social stability. The continued failure of public institutions to deliver the benefits of growth and higher incomes to all groups, and not just a small elite, also threatens progress. And a serious and unexpected global economic shock—and not merely a slowdown in China’s growth rate—could prove devastating. Notwithstanding these risks, the trends are positive. Bright and Hruby, like Jerven and Thakkar, conclude that Africa’s progress and potential are outpacing its challenges.

THE REAL AFRICA

My own experience, based on work in more than a dozen African countries over the past decade, leads me to a similar conclusion. There is tremendous promise in the dynamism of young African students and entrepreneurs; in Africa’s vibrant, growing cities; and in countries on the continent that have dramatically improved their leadership and institutions. The region’s abundant world-class innovation and talent are increasingly being harnessed to improve lives and generate wealth. This is an essential story to tell, and its telling is long overdue.

Africa’s large and growing unemployed youth population presents one of the greatest risks to political and social stability.

But this is not the full story, which is always much more complicated than either success or failure. First, any aggregate portrait of a continent obscures its heterogeneity. Every country exhibits its own social, economic, geographic, and political characteristics, and the experience of the average Ghanaian, for example, bears little resemblance to that of the average Sudanese—just as the experience of one of Africa’s billionaires would be unrecognizable to one of its malnourished rural poor. Although convenient for development organizations, a single concept of African growth may be less helpful in understanding what Thakkar calls “a vast polyglot place” and Bright and Hruby describe as “the most diverse continent on the planet.” This diversity demands to be disaggregated at the country and, most important, at the city level. For now, the data are too limited and unreliable, but that is changing as new businesses develop new tools and methods to close this data deficit.

Recognizing these differences will make it easier to tackle what are genuinely continental challenges, such as gaps in energy and infrastructure, sectarian strife, the risk of pandemic disease, and the need for collective action on climate change. These are all problems of cooperation that can be addressed only with an appreciation of both the shared interests and the differences.

Second, in today’s interconnected economy, no region’s destiny is entirely within its own control. High commodity prices and strong Chinese investment, for example, have played a large role in Africa’s recent growth. As both have declined, so have expectations for the continent’s overall prospects. Growth has also been fueled by a successful diaspora bringing its skills back to the continent or sending back remittances. Similarly, developments within Africa affect economies far away: African innovations in mobile banking have been replicated in Asia, African designs can be found in American fashion houses, and African immigrants are altering labor markets in Europe.

Finally, it is time to rethink what it is that’s worth measuring in the first place. It is unmistakably clear that the full measure of progress is not captured by increases in GDP or by any statistical yardstick used by Western economists. At best, such metrics may be imperfect proxies for improvements in the human condition; at worst, they distract from qualities and experiences—peace, health, fulfillment, and so on—that also matter and might be considered more indicative of genuine progress. A more useful analysis would consider alternative metrics derived from real experiences in Africa. It would also be attentive to the perspectives of diverse stakeholders—from entrepreneurs to laborers, farmers to urban dwellers, refugees to landowners, investors to the unemployed, ethnic groups to diaspora communities, the young to the old. With that approach, a truer picture would at last emerge—not of a single Africa but of a continent whose challenges and opportunities are as diverse as the people who call it home.